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The Shareholder Base and Payout Policy
Abstract
We examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consis-
tent with the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external nancing
we nd that rms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain
higher cash holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in
a signicant reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we nd that
rms with small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the
shareholder base even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.
JEL classification: G35, G14, G15.
Keywords: Payout Policy, Investor Recognition, Cost of Capital, Special Dividends, Repur-
chases, Asymmetric Information.
I Introduction
Finance practitioners acknowledge that having a broad shareholder base is an important fac-
tor for many corporate decisions. For example, in a recent study of rm payout policy, Brav,
Graham, Harvey and Michaely ((2005), p. 523) survey nancial executives and conclude
that With respect to payout policy, the rules of the game include ... [to] have a broad and
diverse investor base ...In practice, the acquisition and management of the shareholder base
Switzerland. E-mail: per.oestberg@bf.uzh.ch Phone: +41-44-6342956.
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is the task of the investor relations department or an investor relations rm.1 Wolfe Axelrod
Weinberger Associates LLC, an investor relations rm, state in their company prole Our
e¤orts culminate in a broader shareholder base, increased liquidity, a lower future cost of
capital, and a better valuation relative to the clients peer group.2
Despite the apparent importance of the shareholder base there is little academic evidence
documenting the impact of the shareholder base on corporate decisions. In this paper we
investigate the e¤ect of the shareholder base on the level and method of payout. There are
several arguments that imply that external nancing is costly for rms with small shareholder
bases, either due to asymmetric information or lack of visibility. Firstly, the investor base
may proxy for the amount of external nancing that is available. Merton (1987) argues that
the shareholder base measures the recognition of the rm. He develops an incomplete risk
sharing model where the size of the rms investor base is negatively related to the required
return on the rm and hence its cost of capital.3 In this setting, a small shareholder base
implies that a limited fraction of the market is informed about the stock and hence the rm
has a limited number of investors to raise capital from. Merton argues that the shareholder
base can be expanded (allowing more funds to be raised), but at an increasing cost.4
1Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) and Bushee and Miller (2008) discuss the role of the investor relations
department.
2http://www.wolfeaxelrod.com/prole.htm
3There is a growing literature that documents a relationship between investor recognition and the value
of the rm. Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and King and Segal (2009) consider
the e¤ect of listing decsions on the shareholder base and its implications for rm valuation. Additionally,
Lehavy and Sloan (2008), Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009), and Fang and Peress (2008) document that there
is a cross-sectional relationship between investor recognition and returns and therefore the cost of capital.
4Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) nds that rms that have higher advertising expenditure also have
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Secondly, having a large number of shareholders may reduce asymmetric information
between insiders and outsiders through more information production. The intuition behind
this argument is captured in the model of Holmström and Tirole (1993). In their model,
an increase in liquidity trading (the investor base) leads to an increase in stock price infor-
mativeness through more information acquisition by speculators. Additionally, empirically
it has been documented that analysts tend to follow rms that have more investors.5 ;6 So a
large investor base leads to greater analyst coverage and overall more information production
which ultimately implies less asymmetric information about the rm.
Both of the above arguments imply that external nancing is costly for rms with small
shareholder bases. E¤ectively, for rms with limited shareholder bases there is a wedge
between the internal and external cost of funds.7
We develop and test three hypotheses concerning the relation between the shareholder
base and payout policy using a sample of rms on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX between
1984 and 2004. First, a negative relation between the cost of external nancing and the
shareholder base implies that we expect rms with small shareholder bases to maintain
higher cash reserves and pay out less to their shareholders. We nd that small shareholder
base rms have lower payout levels and have larger cash reserves. Firms at the 25th percentile
of the shareholder base hold between 4:75% and 6:38% more in cash reserves and pay out
a larger number of shareholders, implying that the shareholder base can be expanded at a cost.
5See Bhushan and OBrien (1990).
6Additionally, Bjerring, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1993), Dimson and Marsh (1984) and Womack (1996)
document that analyst forecasts are informative.
7Kaplan and Zingales (1997) dene a nancial constraint as a wedge between the internal and external
cost of capital.
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between 12:32% and 23:37% less of their total assets (all relative to the unconditional mean)
than rms at the 75th percentile. We corroborate the above results on payout and cash
holdings in an experimental setting by considering the introduction of decimal quotes on
the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in 2001. Decimalization signicantly lowered trading
costs and thereby raised the demand for shares by retail investors and resulted in larger
shareholder bases. This increase in the shareholder base is associated with increased payout
and decreased cash holdings.
Second, given that there is a relation between the shareholder base and the cost of external
nancing this has a potential implication for the method of payout. A rm considering
making a special distribution can do it either in the form of a share repurchase or through
a special dividend. However, an open market repurchase program may result in a smaller
shareholder base if some shareholders tender all of their shares. We verify this conjecture
by demonstrating that a share repurchase program reduces the shareholder base of the rm
by at least 3:70% over the year of repurchase and the subsequent year. In contrast, non-
repurchasing rms experience, on average, a 3:69% increase in the shareholder base over a
two year period. Additionally, we nd that special dividends either have a neutral or even
positive e¤ect on the shareholder base. Hence, we argue that while repurchases are more tax
e¢ cient they come at a cost of reduction in the shareholder base and therefore higher costs
of external nancing.
Third, given that a repurchase reduces the size of the shareholder base, we examine
whether rms with already limited shareholder bases are less likely to use a repurchase as a
payout method and thereby reduce the size of the shareholder base even further. We nd
that the shareholder base signicantly a¤ects the decision to undertake one-time distribu-
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tions to shareholders and the method of distribution (special dividend or share repurchase).
Small shareholder base companies are more likely to pay special dividends. Conditional on
undertaking a special distribution, companies with small shareholder bases choose to use
a special dividend (rather than repurchase stock) in 9:05% of cases while 6:49% of special
distributions of large shareholder base rms are special dividends.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on investor recognition and investor
relations. This literature (see footnote 3) documents the e¤ect of the shareholder base on rm
value and returns. The nding that the size of the shareholder base is negatively related to
returns implies that small shareholder base rms have high costs of nancing. We contribute
to this literature by showing that the shareholder base is also related to payout policy.
There are a number of papers that considers the e¤ect of investor composition on payout
policy. For example, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine the relation between institu-
tional holdings and payout policy. Among other things, they nd that institutions prefer
dividend-paying to non-dividend paying rms and rms that repurchase shares. Instead of
considering the composition of the rms investor base we examine the size of the shareholder
base. In fact, our measure of the shareholder base is weakly negatively related to the degree
of institutional holdings (the correlation is  8:8%), which makes intuitive sense if institu-
tional investors hold larger positions. Nonetheless, we control for institutional holdings in
our estimations and this does not a¤ect our results qualitatively. Additionally, in a robust-
ness section, we demonstrate that our results are independent of investor composition. In
essence, the clientele literature considers stock demand by certain investor groups and relates
that to payout policy whereas we consider the relation between total investor demand and
payout policy.
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Our paper is related to the extensive literature on the level and method of payout. One of
the central and most cited determinants of the level of payout is agency costs (Easterbrook
(1984), and Jensen (1986)). Early work by Roze¤ (1982) uses the shareholder base as a proxy
for the degree to which the rm is exposed to agency costs. In Roze¤s setting a rm that
has a large shareholder base is also more exposed to agency problems and therefore pays out
more as dividends. Roze¤documents a positive correlation between the shareholder base and
dividend payout, which is what we nd (except that we consider Total Payout). Although
the size of the shareholder base may be related to the agency costs of the rm, studies that
examine the e¤ect of exogenous increases in the shareholder base (Amihud, Mendelson and
Uno (1999), see section IV.C below) document that increases in the shareholder base are
also associated with price increases.8 If the shareholder base only is a proxy for agency costs,
then we would expect a price decrease following an exogenous increase in the shareholder
base as the agency problem has been aggravated. In our regressions we include a host of
control variables that capture agency costs.
Another strand of literature relates nancial constraints to the level of payout (e.g.,
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Whited and Wu (2006)). This literature
uses a set of variables (including whether a rm has a positive dividend payout) to construct
measures of the cost of external nancing. In contrast, this paper provides evidence that the
shareholder base inuences the cost of external nancing and therefore is related to payout
and cash holdings of rms.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that examines the determinants of the
8See footnote 3.
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method of payout.9 To our knowledge we are the rst to demonstrate that a repurchase
adversely a¤ects the shareholder base and that this adverse impact is a possible explanation
for why rms pay dividends even though repurchases are more tax e¢ cient. Other poten-
tial reasons for undertaking a repurchase rather than a dividend include trading gains by
insiders (Barclay and Smith (1988)), improved stock liquidity (Barclay and Smith (1988)),
exibility (Stephens and Weisbach (1998)) and maintaining the Earnings-Per-Share (EPS)
in the presence of stock option exercise (Kahle (2002)).10
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present testable
hypotheses, and we describe our data in Section III. In Section IV , we present empirical
ndings. We consider the robustness of our results in Section V , and in Section V I we
conclude.
II Testable Hypotheses
Our testable hypotheses come from the tenet that there is a negative relation between the
size of the shareholder base and the cost of external nancing. For example, the model of
Holmström and Tirole (1993) can be used to justify why price informativeness is related to
9Black (1976) coined the term dividend puzzle which refers to the fact that dividends represent a
substantial proportion of total payout even though repurchases are more tax e¢ cient. To explain this puzzle
there has to be some drawback to using a repurchase as a payout method instead of dividends. As we have
shown, one di¤erence between repurchases and dividends is that a repurchase reduces the shareholder base
while a dividend does not. Therefore a possible explanation to the dividend puzzle is that rms are reluctant
to reduce their shareholder base.
10It is noteworthy that the improved liquidity, exibility and EPS motives for undertaking a repurchse
cannot explain the extensive use of dividends since they all present advantages of repurchases over dividends.
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the size of the shareholder base.11 If a larger shareholder base implies more liquidity traders,
then this creates incentives for speculators to acquire more information. This in turn leads to
lower asymmetric information and therefore to a lower cost of external nancing. Since the
shareholder base is related to price informativeness the wedge between the cost of internal
and external funds is decreasing in the size of the shareholder base.
Merton (1987) argues that a good measure of the recognition of a rm is the size of its
shareholder base. Likewise, the recognition of a rm is related to the availability of external
nancing. So a rm with a large shareholder base is widely recognized and therefore has a
large pool of investors to raise nancing from. Merton argues that increasing the shareholder
base may be possible, but at a cost that is increasing. Therefore, it is costly for a rm with
a limited shareholder base to raise external nancing since this requires a costly increase in
the shareholder base (the rm requires more recognition).
The above arguments imply that the wedge between the cost of internal and external
nancing is negatively related to the size of the shareholder base. Therefore we expect rms
with small shareholder bases to rely more on internal nancing. As a result these rms are
expected to pay out less to their shareholders and maintain higher cash reserves. Stated
formally,
H1: Firms with small shareholder bases pay out less and hold larger cash reserves.
Since the shareholder base and the cost of external nancing are negatively related, a
11Harris ((2003), p. 238) writes that Informed trading is most protable in markets with many uninformed
traders. In such markets, many informed traders compete to acquire information and act on it. These markets
therefore have very informative prices.
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reduction in the shareholder base will make external nancing even more expensive which
leads to a lower rm value. Indeed, Brav et al. ((2005), p. 515) report that Many rms
feel that their stock price would fall if they had a less diverse investor base.
The method of payout may have implications for the size of the shareholder base. For
example, when a rm undertakes a repurchase there are two countervailing e¤ects on the
size of the shareholder base. On the one hand, the rm generates attention by announcing
a repurchase, but on the other hand, if a substantial proportion of shareholders tender their
entire stake then the shareholder base will fall as a result of a repurchase. We anticipate the
second e¤ect to dominate. Hence our second hypothesis:
H2: Share repurchases reduce the size of the shareholder base.
If a repurchase results in a smaller shareholder base, we expect that rms will try to avoid
undertaking a repurchase if the shareholder base is already limited (and external nancing
is expensive). In contrast, a special dividend has no adverse impact on the shareholder base.
This leads to the following testable hypothesis:
H3: Firms with small shareholder bases are more likely to pay a special dividend and less
likely to undertake a repurchase.
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III Sample and Variable Construction
A Data
Our sample includes rms listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. Data on returns, prices, re-
purchases and shares outstanding of stocks are obtained from the CRSP-Compustat Merged
Industrial Database (CCM). We only consider rms with CRSP share codes 10 or 11. There-
fore, we exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs, and shares of rms incorporated outside
the United States. Our main variable of interest is the number of common shareholders of
record (Shareholder Base, CCM data 100), hence we exclude rms for which this variable is
missing.
We consider the period from 1984 to 2004. The choice of this period is motivated by the
introduction of SEC Rule 10b-18 in 1982, which provides a legal safe harbor for companies
repurchasing their shares, which greatly reduced the ambiguity associated with this activity.
Furthermore, since 1984, rms have been required to report the value of their repurchases
in their cash ow statements and this item can be found in the CRSP-Compustat Merged
database as data item 115.
Our dependent variables are measures of rm cash holdings and payout. We follow Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and dene Cash as the ratio of cash to total assets
net of cash. Total Payout is dened as the sum of total dividends and repurchases over
total assets. We construct our measure of repurchases using the CCM data item Purchase
of Common and Preferred Stock (item 115), which reports the amount of money a company
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spends on repurchasing its own securities.12 ;13 To construct our variable Fraction Repurchased
we divide the dollar value of shares repurchased by market capitalization. We further screen
stock repurchases by setting repurchases equal to zero for any rm that does not repurchase
at least 1% of its market value of equity (as in Dittmar (2000)).
We draw from DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) in identifying special dividends.
We classify a cash distribution as a special dividend if it carries distribution code of 1262 or
1272. These codes are used by CRSP if dividends are labeled year-end, nal, extra, or special.
We do not include interimdividends (code 1282) since they are relatively uncommon in
our sample period. We also exclude dividends with distribution code 1292 which are dened
as non-recurring, or proceeds from sale of rights because they are generally not pure
cash payouts to stockholders. We set a special dividend dummy (Special Dividend) to 1 if a
company has paid a special dividend in a particular year and 0 otherwise.
In selecting our sample we omit rms with missing or negative values of Market Capital-
ization and Book-to-Market. We winsorize all of our variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
We also remove companies with values of Cash above 0:8. This leaves us with 52; 679 rm
year observations which is the basis for our analysis.14
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our data. In our sample, rm cash holdings
(Cash) are on average 14:62% of total assets. This is in line with Opler et al. (1999). The
12As a robustness test we have removed repurchases of preferred stock from our measure of repurchases
(like in Dittmar (2000) and Weisbenner (2004)). The results are not a¤ected.
13Banyi, Dyl and Kahle (2008) compare the accuracy of di¤erent sources of repurchase data and conclude
that Compustat purchases of common stock is the most accurate.
14As a robustness test, we removed all nancial and regulated rms from our sample without a¤ecting our
results qualitatively.
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average total payout (Total Payout) in our sample is 2:40% of total assets. The average
rm in our sample has 17; 150 shareholders of record (Shareholder Base). However, the
median rm only has 1; 830 shareholders. To correct for skewness we use the logarithm
of the Shareholder Base. Additionally, a repurchase is undertaken in 22:66% of all rm
years. A special dividend is undertaken in 1:71% of all rm years. In unreported analysis
we document a declining trend in the frequency of special dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2000)
conclude that this is due to rms that undertake special dividends frequently relabel these
as regular dividends. However, like DeAngelo et al. (2000) we also nd that the frequency
of largespecials does not decrease over our sample period.
There are a number of alternative stories that we need to control for. First, Grinstein and
Michaely (2005) document that institutions avoid rms that do not pay dividends. However,
among dividend payers they prefer rms that pay lower dividends. Institutions also prefer
repurchasers and those rms that repurchase regularly. To that end, we include among
our control variables the fraction of outstanding equity held by institutions (Institutional
Ownership) which we calculate from 13f-lings that are included in the CDA / Spectrum
database.
Second, several papers document that undervaluation is an important motive for under-
taking a repurchase (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Lakon-
ishok and Vermaelen (2000)). It could well be that rms with large shareholder bases are
undervalued and therefore repurchase more often. We control for the undervaluation mo-
tive by including the book-to-market ratio, the stock performance during the previous year
and the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2007) measure of misvaluation in our
estimations.
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Third, since we argue that a small shareholder base creates a wedge between the cost
of internal and external funds our paper is related to the literature on nancial constraints.
To control for traditional measures of nancial constraints we include the Whited and Wu
(2006) index (Whited-Wu) in our regressions.15
Fourth, Barclay and Smith (1988) argue that one reason to avoid undertaking a repur-
chase is that this may harm stock liquidity. They nd that the bid-ask spread widens around
repurchase announcements.16 Using detailed buyback data from Hong Kong, Brockman and
Chung (2001) nd that the bid-ask spread widens and the depth narrows during repurchase
periods. However, they also nd that the spread and the depth returns to benchmark levels
once managers disclose that they are the source of the trading.17 ;18 Nevertheless, we control
for liquidity by considering the volume of shares traded over the past year divided by the
number of shares outstanding (Stock Liquidity).
Fifth, a large shareholder base may indicate that ownership is dispersed and therefore
rms with large shareholder bases might be more exposed to agency problems. If large
shareholder base rms are more exposed to agency problems we would expect them to pay
out less to investors. To control for di¤erences in agency costs across rms we consider
15In unreported results, we have also included the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index in our estimations
without a¤ecting our results qualitatively.
16Miller and McConnell (1995) nd no evidence of a widening in bid-ask spread when considering a di¤erent
sample and methodology.
17Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) nd that rms that are actively repurchasing are less sensitive to market
movements in a bearish market.
18In a study of U.S. repurchases, Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) nd that liquidity increases after a
repurchase and they attribute this result to the di¤erence in the disclosure environment between Hong Kong
and the U.S..
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the fraction of shares owned by the top ve company executives (Managerial Ownership).
Additionally, we control for di¤erences in incentives provided to executives by including the
proportion of total compensation to the management of the rm paid in the form of stock
options (Option Based Compensation). Including this variable in our analysis also ensures
that our results are not driven by repurchases that are undertaken to o¤set stock grants
and option exercises by rm managers. These measures are calculated from the Thompson /
Reuters Insider Database. A number of studies examine the relation between rm governance
and cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford, Mansi and Maxwell
(2008)). We therefore include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance index (G)
as a control variable. We also include Board Size and Board Independence as controls.
The board controls as well as the Gompers et al. index are obtained from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
Last, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) document that one motive for undertaking
a repurchase is to alter the rms capital structure. To that end, we include the debt-to-
equity ratio (Debt-to-Equity) when determining the factors that inuence the decision of
undertaking a repurchase or paying a special dividend.
We provide a detailed description of the variables in the Appendix.
B Excess Shareholder Base
Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) note that there is a strong relation between the Number
of Common Shareholders and variables such as Market Capitalization and Age. In order to
ensure that our results are not driven by other rm characteristics which are not directly
15
related to the recognition of the rm, we remove the e¤ect of a number of variables on the
Number of Common Shareholders. In all subsequent analysis we use the residuals from this
regression, which we call Excess Shareholder Base, as our measure of the shareholder base.19
In a di¤erent context, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2009) estimate a similar regression and use
the residuals as a measure of rm visibility.
Table 2 presents our regression results. For each of the 22 years in our sample we estimate
a cross-sectional regression where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the Number of
Common Shareholders and then we report the average of all the estimates. We follow
Grullon et al. and include Age, Return on Equity, Market Capitalization, 1/Share Price,
Stock Liquidity, Past Year Return and Volatility as explanatory variables. It is important to
account for size since even though larger rms have more press coverage and larger analyst
following, which is associated with larger recognition they also have more shares available
to buy. Illiquid stocks might have fewer shareholders due to the large transaction costs
associated with trading them and not due to recognition. Therefore to control for transaction
costs we include both 1/Share Price and the volume based liquidity measure Stock Liquidity.
Both Age and Volatility control for total risk of the rm. Firms that have performed well
recently might have a lot of investors, but this does not necessarily represent a permanent
rm characteristic. To that end, we include Return on Equity and Past Year Return to
control for the e¤ect of recent performance on the shareholder base.20 Certain investors
19Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009) document that the residual shareholder base is negatively related to
returns.
20Unlike Grullon et al. we do not include advertising expenditure in our regressions. Firstly, it is likely to
be highly related to the recognition that the rms has by individual investors. Secondly, including a measure
of advertising expenditure would result in a tenfold decrease in sample size.
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might only invest in valueor glamourstocks and therefore we include Book-to-Market
into our specications as a control for rm type.
The regression results are qualitatively similar to what Grullon et al. (2004) nd. Large,
value and older rms have more shareholders. Additionally, rms that are cheap to trade
(that have a high 1/Share Price) also have more shareholders. Firms with good recent per-
formance (both in terms of Return on Equity and Past Year Return) have fewer shareholders.
Grullon et al. (2004) point out that this nding is consistent with the disposition e¤ect
whereby investors hold on to past losers and sell winners.
We dene Excess Shareholder Base (ExShBase) as the residual from this regression and
employ it as our measure of recognition throughout the rest of our study. A rm who has
a positive Excess Shareholder Base (residual) has a larger shareholder base than expected
according to its fundamentals. Using the Excess Shareholder Base instead of the Number
of Common Shareholders does not alter the direction of the e¤ects that we measure, but in
general reduces the economic magnitude of the e¤ects measured.
For the shareholder base to be related to the cost of external nancing it is important
that having a small shareholder base is a persistent characteristic. If this is not the case
then a rm with a small shareholder base can just wait until its shareholder base returns to
normal levels.
To examine whether the shareholder base is persistent, we split rms into quartiles on the
basis of ExShBase. Firms in quartile 4 have the largest shareholder bases adjusting for their
fundamentals. We identify when a rm enters the largest quartile for the rst time and we
record which quartile these rms belong to over the subsequent 5 year period.21 The results
21We restrict our analysis to rms with at least 5 years of uninterrupted values of Excess Shareholder Base
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are provided in Table 3. After 5 years, 56:5% of rms originally falling into the quartile with
the largest shareholder bases still belong to this quartile. Another 31:1% have migrated to
quartile 3, which implies that 87:6% of rms originally in quartile 4 still have a shareholder
base that is larger than what is expected according to their fundamentals. The results are
similar for rms that have the smallest shareholder bases (quartile 1). After 5 years, 51:9%
of quartile 1 rms still belong to quartile 1. In total, 82:8% of quartile 1 rms still belong
to quartile 1 or 2 after 5 years. Thus, having a small or large shareholder base seems to be
a persistent rm characteristic.
IV Results
A The Shareholder Base and Payout
Firms with negative values of ExShBase have smaller shareholder bases than implied by
their fundamental characteristics. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect these rms to have
high costs of external nancing and therefore pay out less. In Panel A of Table 4 we provide
univariate evidence on the relation between ExShBase and Total Payout. Companies with
negative values of ExShBase pay out on average 2:21% while rms with positive values pay
out on average 2:59% (or 17:19% more) of their total assets. Additionally, when we only
consider rms with positive values of Total Payout, small shareholder base rms pay out on
average 3:50% and large shareholder base rms pay out 3:89% (or 11:14% more ) of their
following entering the highest (lowest) quartile of ExShBase. This restriction does not a¤ect our results in
any signicant way.
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total assets. These di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 4 we restrict the Total Payout to be between 0% to 100% of net
income. This selection reduces the average payout signicantly. Firms with positive values
of ExShBase pay out 1:55% of total assets whereas rms with negative values pay out 1:41%
(positive ExShBase rms payout 9:93% more). The di¤erence is statistically signicant.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the results from our multivariate analysis with Total Payout
as the dependent variable. Specications (1) and (2) are Fama-MacBeth regressions with
industry xed e¤ects. For each year we estimate a Tobit regression with Total Payout as
a dependent variable. We report average regression coe¢ cients. The reported p-values are
based on Newey-West (2 lags) corrected standard errors of the estimated average regressions
coe¢ cients.
The rest of the specications are pooled panel Tobit regressions with time and industry
xed e¤ects with standard errors that are clustered at industry (SIC2) level. Neyman and
Scott (1948) document that maximum likelihood estimation with xed e¤ects results in an
"incidental parameter problem." In a recent contribution Greene (2004a) documents that in
Tobit regressions the incidental parameter problem is small when T is 5. Given that in our
case T is equal to 21, and that univariate and Fama-MacBeth results corroborate our Tobit
results, we are comfortable that our results are not driven by econometric errors.22
Specication (3) includes ExShBase2 in order to capture non-linearities in the relation
22Greene (2004b) documents that the incidental parameter problem is larger for Probit regressions (which
we use in Section IV.E). However, he benchmarks the xed e¤ect, pooled and random e¤ect estimators in a
Probit setting and concludes (p. 111) "It seems likely based on this and all the preceding results that for T
larger than 8, the results will probably favour the xed-e¤ects estimator."
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between the shareholder base and payout. In all of our specications ExShBase is signi-
cantly positively related to Total Payout.
In terms of relative economic impact, considering specication (3) the impact of ExShBase
is roughly 53% the impact of Market Capitalization and 82% the impact of Book-to-Market.
Specication (6) illustrates that the impact of the shareholder base on payout is greater than
that of governance variables like Board Size, Board Independence and G-index.
In specication (4), going from the 25th to the 50th percentile of ExShBase increases Total
Payout by 0:39%. However, going from the 50th to the 75th percentile of ExShBase only
increases Total Payout by 0:24%. This indicates that the relation between the shareholder
base and payout is stronger the smaller the shareholder base is and is consistent with the
hypothesis that nancial constraints are more binding for rms with smaller shareholder
bases.
Arguably, the relation between the shareholder base and payout should be attenuated
for rms that have a need for external nancing. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)
demonstrate that rms in need of external nancing will not pay out any dividend regardless
of their degree of nancial constraints. Intuitively, a rm that has a need for nancing
will invest its earnings rather than retain the earnings or distribute them to shareholders
irrespective of the size of the shareholder base.
To test this we estimate the need for external nancing as done by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) and Durnev and Kim (2005). We dene the external nancing need as the
di¤erence between the rms actual growth rate and the sustainable growth rate. We estimate
the actual growth rate as the prior 2-year geometric average of annual growth rate in total
assets. We estimate the sustainable growth rate as the 2-year average of ROEt=(1 ROEt),
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where ROEt is the rm return on equity in year t.
We dene a dummy variable, Need External Financing that takes the value of 1 if the
growth of total assets is greater than the sustainable growth rate (ROEt=(1 ROEt)) and 0
otherwise.23 In our sample 32:67% of rms are in need of external nancing. Specication (2)
and (5) interacts our variable ExShBase with the dummy variable Need External Financing
and its complement. In both specications we nd that the e¤ect of the shareholder base is
signicantly larger for rms that do not need external nancing.
Turning to the control variables, as expected, variables that capture the amount of funds
available to the rm, such as Cash and Operating Income are positively related to the payout
level. Additionally, variables that capture outows from the rm, such as the Debt-to-Equity
ratio and Capex are negatively related to payout, illustrating that there is a trade-o¤ in the
use of funds. Companies with higher return volatility and overvalued companies seem to
have lower payout levels. Additionally, rms that are more nancially constrained according
to the Whited-Wu index pay out less. The inclusion of the Whited-Wu index, Institutional
Ownership and Industry Concentration does not a¤ect our results in any signicant way. Also
the inclusion of corporate governance variables G-index, Board Size and Board Independence
does not a¤ect our conclusion that the shareholder base is positively related to Total Payout.
Overall, these results support the hypothesis that the shareholder base is positively and
23We choose ROEt=(1   ROEt) rather than ROLTCt=(1   ROLTCt) (where ROLTC is the return on
long term capital) or (ROAt bt)=(1 ROAt bt) (where ROA is the return on assets and b is the fraction
of earnings retained for investment) since we are interested in the relation between the need for nancing
and payout to equity holders. See Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for a lengthier description of the
alternative measures of the need for nancing.
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statistically signicantly related to payout.
B The Shareholder Base and Cash Holdings
Panel A of Table 5 presents univariate results of the relation between Excess Shareholder Base
and Cash. Companies with small shareholder bases (negative ExShBase) on average have
a ratio of cash to total assets of 16:48% while rms with large shareholder bases (positive
ExShBase) maintain on average cash holdings of 12:76% of total assets (or 29:95% less).
The di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The e¤ect is similar in economic
magnitude and statistically signicant when we consider median cash holdings.
Panel B of Table 5 displays our regression analysis. Specications (1) and (2) are cross-
sectional Fama-MacBeth regression while the other specications are pooled panel regres-
sions. The coe¢ cient of ExShBase is negative and statistically signicant in all specications,
indicating that the shareholder base is negatively related to cash holdings. Inspecting spec-
ication (4) that includes a squared term, ExShBase2, we see that going from the 25th to
the 75th percentile in terms of ExShBase decreases Cash by 0:75% which represents 5:26%
of the unconditional mean. However, going from the 25th to the 50th percentile of ExShBase
decreases Cash by 0:45% and going from the 50th to the 75th percentile of ExShBase only
decreases Cash by 0:30%. Therefore, just as with Total Payout, the relation between the
Excess Shareholder Base and Cash is non-linear. The relation is stronger for rms with small
shareholder bases. The economic magnitude of the shareholder base is similar across all of
our specications.
The relative impact of the shareholder base on Cash is economically signicant. Con-
22
sidering specication (3) the impact of ExShBase is roughly 35% the impact of Market
Capitalization and 19% the impact of Book-to-Market. Specication (6) illustrates that the
impact of the shareholder base on Cash is 84% of G-index, but 2:7 times larger than the
impact of Board Size.
Like in the payout case, we investigate whether the need for external nancing attenuates
the impact of the shareholder base. Specications (2) and (5) document that the slope coef-
cient is signicantly lower for those rms that have a need for external nancing, indicating
that for rms that have no surplus earnings to retain the e¤ect of shareholder base on cash
is weakened.
Concerning the control variables, we nd that larger rms have lower Cash ratios. Since
large rms consist of more projects that have less than perfectly correlated cash needs, it
makes sense that larger rms maintain smaller cash to asset levels. Likewise, value rms
(high Book-to-Market ratio) have lower cash holdings. The lower cash holdings of large rms
and rms with high Book-to-Market ratios has also been documented by Opler et al. (1999)
and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003). Additionally, rms with high levels of Capex
have lower Cash ratios. Variables that are related to the amount of cash that is disgorged to
investors, such as Institutional Ownership and the Debt-to-Equity level are also associated
with lower cash holdings. Finally, rms that are more nancially constrained according to
the Whited-Wu index have larger cash holdings.
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C Decimalization, the Shareholder Base and Payout
So far we have documented that there is a relation between the shareholder base and payout
and cash. However, this does not establish that having a large shareholder base leads to
higher payout levels and lower cash retention. It could equally well be that the rms payout
and cash policies attract a larger shareholder base.
To establish a causal link we need an exogenous shock that a¤ects the shareholder base,
but does not alter the rms operations and thereby has no direct e¤ect on payout policy or
cash holdings. The introduction of decimal quotes on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in
the mid of 2000 to the end of April 2001 signicantly lowered the transaction costs associated
with trading stocks and thereby increased investor demand and therefore also the size of the
shareholder base.24 This e¤ectively alters the demand for the rms stock without directly
a¤ecting the rms investment opportunity set. Despite the market collapsing in early to
mid 2001 the average rms shareholder base increased by 2:56% between the end of 1999
and the end of 2001. Fang, Noe and Tice (2009) use decimalization to establish a causal link
between liquidity and rm performance.25 In an earlier contribution Amihud, Mendelson
and Uno (1999) consider a very similar experiment. They examine the e¤ect of a reduction
in the minimum trading lot in Japan and nd that this institutional change is associated
with an increase in the shareholder base, liquidity and stock price.
24On the 29th January 2001 the NYSE and AMEX switched to decimal quotes while NASDAQ switched
on the 9th of April.
25Both Bessembinder (2003) and Furne (2003) have documented that decimilization had a signicant
impact on transaction costs. They also nd that the gain is restricted to those stocks that are actively
traded.
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Like Fang et al. we consider the change in our dependent variables (Total Payout and
Cash) one year prior the event to one year after the event. We choose this event window since
each market shifted some stocks to decimal trading at earlier dates.26 Our main independent
variable is the change in the shareholder base. As a control variable we include E¤ective
Relative Spread to capture the impact of changes in liquidity on payout and cash holdings.27
Additionally, in case decimalization a¤ected the relative incentives of retail investors and
institutional investors to hold shares we have included the change in Institutional Ownership
(measured as the change fraction of outstanding equity held by institutional investors) as a
control variable. The correlations between  log #Shareholders, Institutional Ownership
and E¤ective Relative Spread are all below 10% in absolute terms.
Panel A of Table 6 presents our results when we consider the change in Total Payout
as the dependent variable. The main independent variable in specication (1), the change
in the log of the number of shareholders, is positively and statistically signicantly (at the
1% level) related to the Total Payout. In terms of economic signicance, a one standard
deviation larger change in the log of number of shareholders leads to a 0:25% larger increase
26Bessembinder (2003) notes that roughly 150 stocks on the NYSE were introduced at various dates to
decimal trading prior to the 29th January 2001. Likewise roughly 200 stocks on the NASDAQ were shifted
to decimal trading prior on two dates prior to the 9th of April.
27We use the E¤ective Relative Spread as opposed to Stock Liquidity that we use in the rest of the paper
for two reasons. First, to make sure that our results are comparable to those of Fang et al. (2009). Second,
Stock Liquidity requires the data from the previous year which would mean having data for the numerator
from after the event and data for the denominator from before the event. Nonetheless, our results are not
qualitatively altered depending on our choice of liquidity denition.We are grateful to Shane Corwin for
sharing with us data on Relative Spreads estimated from TAQ.
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in Total Payout. This should be compared to mean change in Total Payout of  0:89%
over our observation period. Specication (3) is identical to specication (1) except that
we consider the ExShBase as the main independent variable. A one standard deviation
increase in ExShBase leads to an increase in Total Payout of 0:40% and the e¤ect is
statistically signicant at the 1% level.
We consider the same control variables as Fang et al. (2009) with the exception of the
S&P 500 dummy that is insignicant in all of their specications. Interestingly, the change
in institutional ownership is never statistically signicantly related to the change in Total
Payout and the sign of the coe¢ cient changes depending on whether we consider only rms
with positive payout.
An equal fall in transaction costs across stocks implies a larger relative impact on stocks
with low prices. Therefore it is likely that decimalization was a larger event for low price
stocks. To investigate this conjecture we introduce two dummy variables; Low Price (High
Price) which takes the value 1 if the price is between ve and ten dollars (above ten dollars)
and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 36:72% of stocks were in the $5 to $10 price range at the end
of 1999. In specications (2) and (4) we interact our measure of the shareholder base with
dummy variables for the stock price level to examine whether the strength of the relation
di¤ers across stock price levels. As expected, in both specications the economic e¤ect is
substantially larger for low price stocks.
To make sure that our results are not in some way inuenced by non-paying rms we
consider only rms that have positive payout levels in the beginning of 1999 in specications
(5) to (8). Specications (5) and (6) has as main independent variable the change in the log
of the number of shareholders while specications (7) and (8) considers ExShBase. The
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signicance levels and economic impact are very similar to specications (1) to (4).
In Panel B of Table 6 we consider Cash as dependent variable. Like in Panel A we
consider the change in in the log of the number of shareholders in specications (1) and
(2) while specications (3) and (4) uses ExShBase as the main independent variable. In
both specications our proxy for the change in the shareholder base is negatively related to
the change in cash holdings (Cash) and the relation is statistically signicant at the 1%
level. In specication (1), a one standard deviation increase in the change in the number
of shareholders results in a reduction of cash holdings of 1:61%. The corresponding impact
in specication (3) of ExShBase on the change in cash holdings is a reduction of 3:26%.
These numbers should be compared to the unconditional mean change in cash holdings of
 2:25%. Specications (2) and (4) interact our dummy variables Low Price and High Price
with our measures of the shareholder base. Similarly to when we considered payout, the
relation between changes in the shareholder base and Cash is signicantly stronger for low
price stocks for which decimalization was a larger event. Additionally, we nd that rms that
experience positive changes in Institutional Ownership, Total Assets and Past Year Return
also have positive changes in cash levels. In both panels of Table 6 we include industry xed
e¤ects and cluster standard errors on the industry level.
The results of these panels indicate that when there is an exogenous drop in the transac-
tion costs associated with trading in stocks, rms experience an increase in the shareholder
base. This relation has been documented by Amihud et al. (1999) who nd that reduc-
ing trading costs results in an increase in the shareholder base, liquidity and a stock price
increase. We build on this by showing that there is a relation between the increase in
the shareholder base and how payout and cash holdings change. A larger change in the
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shareholder base results in a larger positive change in payout and a smaller change in cash
holdings. Both of these results are indicative of the cost of external nancing being related
to the size of the shareholder base.
Although no event is a perfect natural experiment, we believe that decimalization has
a number of advantages over other events such as the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation act of 2003 and state level tax changes. By altering the relative tax treatment of
repurchases and dividend the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation act of 2003 altered
the incentives for the two payout methods. Therefore this event has implications for clientele
e¤ects. State level tax changes are often endogenous to the performance of rms within the
state. So, an increase in state level taxes might be motivated by low tax revenues from state
rms which then coincides with low rm payouts. In this setting, it would be hard to argue
that the lower payout is driven by a reduction in the shareholder base due to an increase in
taxes rather than poor rm performance. The advantage with decimalization as an event is
that it is most likely unrelated to rm performance.
D Repurchases and the Shareholder Base
In this section we investigate Hypothesis 2; whether a repurchase reduces the size of the
shareholder base. To argue that maintaining the size of the shareholder base is an important
consideration when choosing the method of payout we need to verify that undertaking a share
repurchase and paying special dividends a¤ects the shareholder base di¤erently. In particular,
for special dividends to have an advantage over repurchases we should observe that the latter
reduces the shareholder base (and thus increases the cost of external nancing) while the
28
former does not. Therefore, we examine the e¤ect of repurchases and special dividends on
the size of shareholder base.
Table 7 presents the results from pooled panel regressions. Our dependent variable is
the change in the logarithm of the number of common shareholders (ShBase) in year t
(and t+ 1), where t is the year when the special distribution is made. We present results in
terms of changes in the number of common shareholders to facilitate interpretation, but the
results in terms of changes in Excess Shareholder Base are qualitatively equivalent.28 Our
main variables of interest are Share Repurchase and Special Dividend. Share Repurchase is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the rm has repurchased at least 1% of its
outstanding stock in year t. Special Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the rm undertakes a special dividend in year t. We nd that undertaking a repurchase
leads to a fall in the shareholder base over years t and year t+ 1. Undertaking a repurchase
in year t leads to a reduction in the shareholder base in year t of between 1:26% and 2:41%.
This reduction continues in year t+ 1, so over two years (t and t+ 1) the shareholder base is
reduced by between between 3:70% and 4:91%.29 At the same time, paying a special dividend
leads to an increase in the shareholder base. This increase in the shareholder base could be
due to the attention that is associated with a special dividend. These results demonstrate
that repurchases and special dividends have a substantial and asymmetric e¤ects on the
shareholder base. If the shareholder base is valuable then there is a clear disadvantage to
using a repurchase as the distribution method.
28The correlation between ExShBase and changes in log number of shareholders is 86:9%.
29In unreported results, we nd that there is no relation between special distributions and the change in
the shareholder base in year t+ 2.
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One potential concern is that rms may issue equity in the future to counter the nega-
tive impact of the repurchase on the shareholder base. In unreported results we nd that
repurchasing rms are less likely to undertake a Seasoned Equity O¤ering at any point
over the next three years. Therefore if anything the di¤erence in shareholder base between
repurchasing and non-repurchasing rms is widened over the following three years.
Open market repurchase programs often continue for several years, so a rm that repur-
chases in year t is likely to have repurchased in year t  1. To control for this we include the
change in the shareholder base over the previous year (sh: baset 1) and the year before
that (sh: baset 2) in our specications. It turns out that there is a negative and signi-
cant relation between current changes and previous changes, implying that there is a certain
amount of mean reversion in the shareholder base. However, the amount of mean reversion
present is limited since Table 3 illustrates that having a small or large shareholder base is a
fairly persistent characteristic.
E The Shareholder Base and the Choice of Payout Method
In this section we investigate Hypothesis 3; whether the size of the shareholder base matters
for the choice of payout method. If maintaining a broad shareholder base is valuable to
the rm then the choice of distribution method is important. A repurchase reduces the
size of the shareholder base and is therefore costly. As a result, rms with particularly
small shareholder bases should be more reluctant to reduce the size of the shareholder base
through a repurchase. On the other hand, a special dividend does not reduce the size of the
shareholder base. Therefore, we expect that rms that have particularly small shareholder
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bases should be more likely to undertake special dividends while rms with large shareholder
bases should favor repurchases that are more tax e¢ cient.
In Table 8, Panel A we examine the univariate relation between the shareholder base and
the decision to undertake a repurchase and pay special dividends. We split rms into two
groups depending on whether they have an Excess Shareholder Base that is below or above
zero.30
We nd that rms with large shareholder bases are 7:5% more likely to undertake a
repurchase than small shareholder base rms. The di¤erence is signicant at the 1% level.
Additionally, large shareholder base rms repurchase 20:5% more than small shareholder
base rms.
The probability that a rm with a large (small) Excess Shareholder Base undertakes a
special dividend is 1:40% (2:02%). The 0:62% di¤erence between rms with positive and
negative Excess Shareholder Base is statistically signicant. So, rms with large shareholder
bases are more likely to undertake a repurchase and less likely to undertake a special dividend
than rms with small shareholder bases.
The decision to undertake a repurchase or a special dividend can be seen as two sequential
decisions. First, the rm decides whether to make a special distribution to shareholders.
Second, the rm chooses the method of distribution. Hypothesis 3 suggests that given a
special distribution, rms with a small shareholder base should be more likely to undertake
a special dividend. In Panel B and C of Table 8 we relate the shareholder base to the method
of payout while conditioning on the decision to make a special distribution to shareholders.
30These results are qualitatively unaltered if we use the median level of the Excess Shareholder Base as
breakpoint.
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To do this, we employ a two stage probit procedure, where the dependent variable in the rst
stage is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the rm undertakes a special distribution
(repurchase or special dividend) and 0 otherwise. In the second stage the dependent variable
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the rm undertakes a repurchase and 0 if
the rm undertakes a special dividend.
Examining the rst stage regressions in Panel B of Table 8, we nd rms with larger
shareholder bases are more likely to make special distributions, which is consistent with our
earlier ndings for total payout. In particular, going from 25th to 75th percentile of Excess
Shareholder Base increases the likelihood of a special distribution by 1:32% or 6:09% relative
to the unconditional mean. Additionally, we nd that larger rms, value rms, rms with
greater operating income and rms with larger amounts of payout in the previous period are
more likely to undertake a special distribution. Firms with larger institutional ownership
and low dividend payout are also more likely to undertake a one time distribution.
In the second stage we consider the method of payout while conditioning on the decision
to undertake a special distribution. We nd that rms with smaller shareholder bases favor
paying special dividends over undertaking repurchases. In particular, a decrease in excess
shareholder base from 75th to 25th percentile increases the likelihood that a special distrib-
ution is a special dividend by 1:08% (or 13:97% relative to the unconditional mean). The
second stage regression also indicates that when controlling for the decision to make a special
distribution, rms with high levels of dividend payout, and good past performance are less
likely to use a repurchase as a payout method. The results of this section indicate that rms
with limited shareholder bases are reluctant to use repurchases as a method of payout.
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V Robustness
There is an extensive literature on the relation between the composition of the shareholder
base and payout policy. For example, institutions may prefer to hold stocks with a partic-
ular payout policy for tax reasons. This would imply causality from the payout policy to
the ownership structure. However, the causality could also be the reverse; institutions prefer
a particular payout policy and they encourage the rm to follow this policy. Two recent
contributions to this literature are Graham and Kumar (2006) and Grinstein and Michaely
(2005) that consider clientele e¤ects due to retail investors and institutional ownership re-
spectively. This literature raises two relevant issues for our paper. First, is it possible that
serial correlation in payout in conjunction with reverse causality could explain our results?
The story would be that payout policy determines the size of the shareholder base and
current levels of payout are determined by past levels of payout. To explore this issue in
this section we examine the relation between our variables of interest in a series of vector
autoregressions. Second, is our variable of interest, Excess Shareholder Base, related to the
ownership composition of the rm? To address this we conduct multivariate sorts to verify
that the relation between Excess Shareholder Base and Total Payout and Cash holds for
stocks with di¤erent investor composition and other characteristics which di¤erent clienteles
might show preference over.
To examine whether past levels of payout determine both current levels of payout and
the size of the shareholder base we estimate the following set of vector autoregressions (e.g.,
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Grinstein and Michaely (2005)):
Payouti;t+1 = c0 + c1Payouti;t + d1ExShBasei;t + Wt + "i;t+1
Cashi;t+1 = a0 + a1Cashi;t + b1ExShBasei;t + Wt + i;t+1
ExShBase
i;t+1
= k0 + k1ExShBasei;t + l1;Cashi;t + z1Payout+ Wt + i;t+1
where Payout, Cash and ExShBase are dened as before andWt is a vector of control
variables and the corresponding coe¢ cients are given by ;  and  for the respective
equation.31 As always, we include industry and time dummies and cluster standard errors
at the industry level.
The estimation results in Table 9 indicate that the Excess Shareholder Base Granger
causes Payout and Cash. However, it does not appear as if past levels of Cash and Payout
Granger causes ExShBase. These results and the e¤ect of decimalization (see section C of
the Results) are supportive of the thesis that the shareholder base a¤ects payout and cash
holdings of rms.
To illustrate that the relation between the shareholder base and payout is not driven
by investor composition we conduct multivariate sorts in Table 10. In Panel A of Table 10
we rst sort companies into ve size quintiles followed by two groups by either Institutional
Ownership (IO) or Book-to-Market orWhited-Wu orMisvaluation. Following this, all stocks
are split into two groups according to their Excess Shareholder Base. This implies that we
have 20 groups of stocks (5 2 2). We report the di¤erence in Total Payout between large
shareholder base rms (greater than median Excess Shareholder Base) and small shareholder
31We use the Akaike Information Criterion to determine the optimal number of lags. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that the optimal number of lags is one.
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base rms. From Hypothesis 1 we expect this di¤erence to be positive. Examining the re-
sults for the three-way sort on size, Institutional Ownership and Excess Shareholder Base,
we nd that in the majority of cases, large shareholder base rms have larger levels of Total
Payout. It is comforting to observe that the exceptions to this relation are found among
the smallest rms (size quintiles 1 and 2). The three-way sorts on size, Book-to-Market and
Excess Shareholder Base indicate that whether the stock is a value or glamour stock cannot
explain the larger payout levels of large shareholder base rms. Similar conclusions can be
drawn when examining the sorts on Whited-Wu and Misvaluation. The results remain eco-
nomically and statistically signicant when considering median payout levels which indicates
that outliers are not driving our results.
In Panel B of Table 10 we follow the same sorting procedure as in Panel A, but consider
di¤erences in Cash holdings between large and small shareholder base rms. Following
Hypothesis 1 we expect the di¤erence to be negative. Examining the results for Institutional
Ownership, we nd that in the majority of cases large shareholder base rms have lower cash
holdings (except for size quintiles 1 and 2 where the di¤erence is not always signicant).
Overall, when examining the other variables that we sort on, we nd strong support for the
hypothesis that large shareholder base rms have lower cash holdings.
The evidence presented in Table 10 indicate that the di¤erences in Total Payout and
Cash between large and small shareholder base rms cannot be explained by di¤erences in
institutional ownership or other variables that might have clienteles.
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VI Conclusion
Survey evidence presented by Brav et. al (2005) and the amount of resources spent by rms
on investor relations indicate that the shareholder base is of importance to rms. One reason
why a large shareholder base is important is that it reduces the cost of external nancing.
Firstly, having a large shareholder base may reduce asymmetric information between insiders
and outsiders through more information production. Secondly, the shareholder base may be
related to the recognition of the rm and hence the availability of external nancing. For
example, Merton ((1987), p.500) states that an increase in the relative size of the rms
investor base will reduce the rms cost of capital and increase the market value of the rm.
Common to both the asymmetric information and the recognition story is that the cost of
external is negatively related to the size of the shareholder base.
We develop and test three implications of there being a relation between the shareholder
base and the cost of external nancing. First, we verify that rms with small shareholder
bases behave as if they are nancially constrained; they payout less and have higher cash
reserves. Second, we document that the method of payout a¤ects the size of the shareholder
base. Undertaking a repurchase reduces the size of the shareholder base while a special
dividend is neutral or even has a slight positive e¤ect. Third, we document that rms
that have small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the
shareholder base further), thereby e¤ectively avoiding a smaller shareholder base. However,
small shareholder base rms are more likely to use special dividends as a distribution method.
Overall, the ndings of this paper suggest that the shareholder base not only a¤ects rm
valuation, but is also an important consideration for payout policy.
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The ndings of this paper suggest that further research should examine how recognition
interacts with rm decisions. A recent example of this is Lou (2010) who nds that rms
increase advertising prior to undertaking seasoned equity o¤erings. However, additional work
is needed to strengthen the link between recognition, returns and corporate policies of rms.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description of Variable and Source of Data 
Shareholder base number of common shareholders of record (in 000s) CRSP-COMPUSTAT Merged database (CCM) 
data item # 100. 
Market cap year-end equity market capitalization: (price x shares outstanding), CCM data 24 x data 25. 
Book-to-market, B/M ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data 9/ data 60. 
Price-to-earnings, P/E ratio of the year-end stock price to earnings per share for the prior fiscal year: CCM data 24/data 58. 
Debt-to-equity, D/E ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data 9/ data 60. 
Operating income ratio of operating income to total assets: CCM data 13/ data 6. 
R&D ratio of R&D to total assets, set zero when missing: CCM data 46 / data 12 
Cash ratio of cash holdings to total assets: CCM data 1/ data 6. 
Dividend payout ratio of dollar amount of dividends to total assets: CCM data 21/ data 6. 
Total payout sum of dollar amount of dividends and dollar volume of repurchases divided by total assets: CCM 
(data 21 + data 115)/ data 6. 
Stock liquidity  sum of the monthly share volume over the previous year divided by the number of shares outstanding 
at the end of the year: CRSP Monthly Stocks. 
Past year return compounded monthly return for the previous year: CRSP Monthly Stocks. 
Volatility stock return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the previous year: 
CRSP Daily Stocks 
Capital expendit, Capex ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm: CCM data 128/ data 6. 
Firm age number of years the firm existed in CRSP daily stocks database. 
Share price median price of the firm share over the previous one year: CRSP daily stocks. 
ROE ratio of earnings to average equity for the prior fiscal year: CCM data 20/ (data 60 + data 60(t-1))/2). 
Institutional ownership year-end fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutional fund managers: Spectrum 13f. 
Industry concentration  sum of the squared market share of each firm in the same industry during a year. Market share is 
defined as the total sales of the firm in a given year divided by the total sales of the industry in the 
year. The industry is defined at the three-digit SIC code level, where the SIC codes have been obtained 
from CRSP Monthly Stocks (SICCD). The sales data comes from CCM: data 12. 
Misvaluation (RRV) sector-adjusted firm-specific valuation errors corresponding to the residuals of Model 3 in Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (RRV) (2005) that regresses market value on leverage, book value 
of assets and net income for twelve Fama-French sectors of the economy. Estimated from CCM. 
Whited-Wu index index of financial constraint of Whited-Wu (2006): WW=-0.091*CF-0.062*DIVPOS+ 0.021*TLTD-
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0.044*LNTA+0.102*ISG-0.035*SG, where CF is a ratio of cash flows to total assets, DIVPOS is an 
indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends, TLTD is the ratio of the long-term 
debt to total assets, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s three-digit industry sales 
growth, SG is firm sales growth. Estimated from CCM. 
Managerial ownership fraction of shares outstanding pertaining to the top 5 company executives. Estimated from Thomson 
Reuters Insider Database. 
Option based 
compensation, OBC  
the proportion of total compensation to the management officers of the firm paid in the form of stock 
options. Estimated from Thomson Reuter Insiders database. 
Board independence  ratio of independent directors to total directors. Estimated from IRRC. 
Board size number of directors divided by the logarithm of total assets. Estimated from IRRC. 
Corporate governance 
index, G 
measured as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003): sum of the number of provisions restricting 
shareholder rights. Data obtained from IRRC. 
Special dividend dummy a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a company paid special dividends in a given year, 0 
otherwise. A dividend is classified as special if it has a distribution code of 1262 or 172. Estimated 
from CRSP monthly data. 
Need external financing a dummy variable which a value of 1 if firm’s actual growth rate exceeds its sustainable growth rate. 
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Durnev and Kim (2005) actual growth is 
measured as 2-year geometric average of annual growth rate in total assets and sustainable growth rate 
as a 2-year average of ROE/(1 − ROE). 
Share repurchase dummy a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a company repurchased shares in a given year, 0 
otherwise. A company is defined to have a repurchase if purchase of common and preferred stock less 
the decrease in par value of preferred stock: (CCM data 115+ data 130) is greater then 1% of total 
assets. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
We present descriptive statistics on the variables used in our study. All variables are described in Appendix. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of the distribution.  
Variable N Mean Median Std 
Shareholder base 52679 17.15 1.83 454.88
Market cap (mln) 52679 1898.18 180.78 10646.16 
Book-to-market (B/M) 52679 0.68 0.55 0.58 
Price-to-earnings (P/E) 52679 15.88 13.72 43.99 
Debt-to-equity (D/E) 52679 0.76 0.34 1.46 
Operating income 52679 0.12 0.13 0.14 
R&D 52679 0.04 0.00 0.27 
Cash 52679 0.14 0.06 0.17 
Dividend payout 52679 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Total payout 52679 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Stock liquidity  52679 1.15 0.74 1.30 
Past year return 52679 0.16 0.15 0.53 
Volatility (x100) 52679 0.68 0.39 1.15 
Capital expenditures (Capex) 52679 0.07 0.05 0.07 
Firm age 52679 22.40 18.00 18.03 
ROE 52679 0.05 0.11 0.40 
Institutional ownership 52679 0.38 0.35 0.25 
Industry concentration 52679 0.08 0.05 0.09 
Misvaluation (RRV) 38492 -0.04 -0.04 0.37 
Whited-Wu index 38492 -0.19 -0.19 0.14 
Managerial ownership 5876 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Option based compensation, OBC  5876 0.38 0.37 0.25 
Board independence  5876 0.63 0.67 0.18 
Board size 5876 1.28 1.26 0.30 
Corporate governance index 5876 9.28 9.00 2.66 
Share repurchase dummy (x100) 52679 22.66 0.00 41.87 
Special dividend dummy (x100) 52679 1.71 0.00 12.97 
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Table 2: Determinants of Shareholder Base 
We present the results of a Fama-MacBeth regression relating the shareholder base to its determinants. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of common shareholders of record (CCM data 100). All variables are 
described in Appendix. We include trading exchange and industry (SIC2) fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by industry (SIC2).  
 Estimate p-Value 
Log (Firm age) 0.40 (0.01) 
ROE -0.17 (0.01) 
Log (Market cap) 0.63 (0.01) 
Log (B/M) 0.23 (0.01) 
1/Share price 1.49 (0.01) 
Stock liquidity 0.01 (0.72) 
Past year return -0.07 (0.01) 
Volatility 5.01 (0.01) 
Exchange dummies  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
Clustering  SIC2 
Adj. R2 0.431 
N 22 
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Table 3: Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base 
We report the results on the persistence of excess shareholder base for firms which are selected when they enter 
the highest (lowest) quartile of excess shareholder base for the first time. Excess shareholder base is the residual 
of the regression reported in Table 2. Firms are followed for five years to determine the quartile they belong in 
the subsequent year. Quartile 4 represents the highest excess shareholder base quartile, and Year 0 is the 
measurement year. Numbers shown are percentages. The number of firms is in brackets. We require companies 
to have non-missing excess shareholder base for the years -1 to +5 relative to the measurement year. 
 Quartile 4 Quartile 3 Quartile 2 Quartile 1
Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base for Firms that are in the 
Highest Quartile of Excess Shareholder Base in Year 0 
Year 0 
1.00 
[563]    
Year 1 
0.68 
[383] 
0.29 
[162] 
0.02 
[13] 
0.01 
[5] 
Year 2 
0.61 
[346] 
0.32 
[179] 
0.05 
[27] 
0.02 
[11] 
Year 3 
0.57 
[322] 
0.34 
[192] 
0.06 
[32] 
0.03 
[17] 
Year 4 
0.58 
[326] 
0.32 
[179] 
0.07 
[38] 
0.03 
[20] 
Year 5 
0.57 
[318] 
0.31 
[175] 
0.08 
[45] 
0.04 
[25] 
     
Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base for Firms that are in the 
Lowest Quartile of Excess Shareholder Base in Year 0 
Year 0    
1.00 
[592] 
Year 1 
0.02 
[12] 
0.03 
[17] 
0.30 
[179] 
0.65 
[384] 
Year 2 
0.04 
[24] 
0.05 
[31] 
0.34 
[199] 
0.57 
[338] 
Year 3 
0.04 
[23] 
0.07 
[43] 
0.30 
[177] 
0.59 
[349] 
Year 4 
0.06 
[34] 
0.08 
[45] 
0.31 
[186] 
0.55 
[327] 
Year 5 
0.06 
[37] 
0.11 
[65] 
0.31 
[183] 
0.52 
[307] 
 
 49
Table 4: Shareholder Base and Total Payout 
We investigate the relation between the excess shareholder base and total payout. We utilize the residuals from 
the regression reported in Table 2 as our measure of the shareholder base. The dependent variable is next year 
total payout, defined as the sum of dividends and repurchases divided by total assets. All variables are described 
in Appendix. Panel A reports the results of univariate analysis both for the full sample and for the sample of 
companies with positive total payout. In panel B we report the results of univariate analysis restricting total 
payout to be within 0% and 100% of net income. Panel C reports result of Tobit regressions. Specifications (1) 
and (2) are Fama-MacBeth regressions with industry fixed effects. For each year we estimate a Tobit regression 
with Total Payout as a dependent variable. We report average regression coefficients. The reported p-Values are 
based on Newey-West (2 lags) corrected standard errors of the estimated average regressions coefficients. 
Specifications (3)-(7) are panel regressions with industry (SIC2) and time fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100. 
Panel A. Univariate Analysis: All Payouts 
 Total Payout Total Payout (>0) 
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean Median N Mean Median 
High (Positive) 26506 2.59% 0.91% 17688 3.89% 2.20% 
Low (Negative) 26173 2.21% 0.64% 16506 3.50% 1.91% 
       
   
t-Stat/p-
Value 
Wilcoxon/p-
Value  
t-Stat/p-
Value 
Wilcoxon/p-
Value 
  10.16 12.09  7.23 8.69 
  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
 
Panel B. Univariate Analysis: Payout Between 0% and 100% of Net Income 
 Total Payout Total Payout (>0) 
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean Median N Mean Median 
High (Positive) 20580 1.55% 0.38% 11763 2.70% 1.86% 
Low (Negative) 21578 1.41% 0.25% 11914 2.56% 1.69% 
       
   
t-Stat/p-
Value 
Wilcoxon/p-
Value  
t-Stat/p-
Value 
Wilcoxon/p-
Value 
  5.27 5.97  3.75 5.35 
  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
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Panel C. Multivariate Regressions 
 Fama-MacBeth Pooled Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Excess shareholder base 0.29 (0.01)   0.43 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01)   0.31 (0.01) 0.20 (0.05) 
*-- ^2       -0.13 (0.01)       
      × Need external financing   0.18 (0.01)     0.28 (0.01)     
      × No need external financing   0.34 (0.01)     0.50 (0.01)     
Log (Market cap) 0.15 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.04 (0.70) 0.42 (0.01) 
Log (B/M) -1.14 (0.01) -1.14 (0.01) -0.75 (0.01) -0.75 (0.01) -0.75 (0.01) -1.47 (0.01) -2.24 (0.01) 
D/E -0.32 (0.01) -0.32 (0.01) -0.36 (0.01) -0.36 (0.01) -0.36 (0.01) -0.28 (0.01) -0.42 (0.01) 
P/E -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Operating income 7.75 (0.01) 7.76 (0.01) 13.73 (0.01) 13.71 (0.01) 13.82 (0.01) 11.36 (0.01) 24.33 (0.01) 
R&D 0.89 (0.01) 0.89 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.85 (0.01) 4.86 (0.01) 
Cash  1.38 (0.01) 1.37 (0.01) 2.11 (0.01) 2.13 (0.01) 2.11 (0.01) 2.43 (0.01) 4.03 (0.01) 
Past year return -0.95 (0.01) -0.95 (0.01) -1.28 (0.01) -1.29 (0.01) -1.28 (0.01) -1.36 (0.01) -1.91 (0.01) 
Volatility -16.73 (0.01) 16.80 (0.01) -57.09 (0.01) -56.32 (0.01) -57.16 (0.01) -45.21 (0.01) -94.36 (0.01) 
Capex -4.76 (0.01) -4.76 (0.01) -8.38 (0.01) -8.43 (0.01) -8.37 (0.01) -10.05 (0.01) -19.03 (0.01) 
Institutional ownership 0.20 (0.41) 0.19 (0.44) 0.37 (0.37) 0.28 (0.62) 0.36 (0.38) 0.63 (0.08) -1.32 (0.01) 
Industry concentration -1.94 (0.31) -1.52 (0.42) -0.08 (0.95) -0.02 (0.99) -0.01 (0.94) -0.10 (0.50) -0.98 (0.68) 
Stock liquidity -0.40 (0.01) -0.40 (0.01) -0.64 (0.01) -0.62 (0.01) -0.64 (0.01) -0.55 (0.01) -0.41 (0.01) 
Misvaluation (RRV)           -1.28 (0.01) -0.35 (0.30) 
Whited-Wu index           -12.53 (0.01) -11.36 (0.01) 
Managerial ownership             -8.39 (0.01) 
OBC             0.37 (0.47) 
Board independence              0.37 (0.46) 
Board size             0.77 (0.06) 
G-index             0.00 (0.99) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering     SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
Adj R2     0.189 0.191 0.189 0.238 0.229 
N 21 21  52679 52679 52679 38492 5876 
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Table 5: Shareholder Base and Cash Holdings 
We investigate the relation between the excess shareholder base and cash holdings. We utilize the residuals from 
the regression reported in Table 2 as our measure of the shareholder base. The dependent variable is cash 
holdings at the end of the next fiscal year divided by total assets net of cash. All variables are described in 
Appendix. In panel A we report the results of univariate analysis. Panel B reports multivariate regression results. 
Specifications (1) and (2) are Fama-MacBeth regressions with industry fixed effects. For each year we estimate 
an OLS regression with Cash as a dependent variable. We report average regression coefficients. The reported 
p-Values are based on Newey-West (2 lags) corrected standard errors of the estimated average regressions 
coefficients. Specifications (3)-(7) are panel regressions with industry (SIC2) and time fixed effects with 
standard errors clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100. 
Panel A. Univariate Analysis 
 Cash Holdings 
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean Median 
High (Positive) 28058 12.76% 5.39% 
Low (Negative) 27891 16.48% 7.02% 
    
  
t-Stat/p-
Value 
Wilcoxon/p-
Value 
  14.04 13.92 
  0.01 0.01 
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Panel B. Multivariate Regressions 
 Fama-MacBeth Pooled Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Excess shareholder base -0.65 (0.01)   -0.54 (0.01) -0.53 (-4.39)   -0.47 (0.01) -0.63 (0.01) 
*-- ^2       0.11 (1.79)       
      × Need external financing   -0.35 (0.01)     -0.39 (0.01)     
      × No need external financing   -0.76 (0.01)     -0.61 (0.01)     
Log (Market cap) -1.01 (0.01) -1.01 (0.01) -0.94 (0.01) -0.95 (0.01) -0.94 (0.01) -0.56 (0.01) -0.73 (0.09) 
Log (B/M) -3.99 (0.01) -4.00 (0.01) -4.00 (0.01) -4.00 (0.01) -4.01 (0.01) -5.66 (0.01) -2.88 (0.01) 
D/E -2.13 (0.01) -2.12 (0.01) -2.11 (0.01) -2.12 (0.01) -2.11 (0.01) -2.38 (0.01) -1.92 (0.01) 
P/E 0.00 (0.41) 0.00 (0.45) -0.00 (0.40) -0.00 (0.42) -0.00 (0.4) -0.00 (0.45) -0.00 (0.39) 
Operating income 1.00 (0.73) 0.96 (0.75) -2.17 (0.08) -2.14 (0.08) -2.19 (0.08) -3.01 (0.10) 10.24 (0.15) 
R&D 14.81 (0.01) 14.82 (0.01) 6.97 (0.01) 6.97 (0.01) 6.96 (0.01) 8.73 (0.01) 25.83 (0.02) 
Total payout  21.99 (0.01) 21.95 (0.01) 21.51 (0.01) 21.65 (0.01) 21.57 (0.01) 25.06 (0.01) 30.78 (0.01) 
Past year return -0.03 (-0.08) -0.03 (-0.08) -0.18 (0.30) -0.17 (0.34) -0.18 (0.30) -0.23 (0.35) 0.80 (0.33) 
Volatility -43.41 (0.01) -44.18 (0.01) -14.20 (0.21) -14.59 (0.22) -14.04 (0.21) -10.96 (0.45) 39.25 (0.62) 
Capex -22.04 (0.01) -22.04 (0.01) -20.13 (0.01) -20.12 (0.01) -20.12 (0.01) -20.30 (0.01) -28.17 (0.01) 
Institutional ownership -2.36 (0.01) -2.32 (0.01) -2.58 (0.01) -2.51 (0.01) -2.58 (0.01) -3.12 (0.01) -7.39 (-0.01) 
Industry concentration 29.23 (0.18) 44.86 (0.11) 3.18 (0.36) 3.27 (0.31) 3.49 (0.36) 4.59 (0.09) 11.23 (0.34) 
Stock liquidity 2.71 (0.01) 2.72 (0.01) 2.49 (0.01) 2.47 (0.01) 2.48 (0.01) 2.52 (0.01) 2.92 (0.01) 
Misvaluation (RRV)           -6.36 (0.01) -2.69 (0.09) 
Whited-Wu index           7.68 (0.07) 11.18 (0.08) 
Managerial ownership             12.34 (0.31) 
OBC             1.45 (1.30) 
Board independence              -0.75 (0.43) 
Board size             -2.98 (-0.03) 
G-index             -0.44 (0.01) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering     SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
Adj R2     0.208 0.208 0.208 0.230 0.372 
N 21 21  52679 52679 52679 38492 5876 
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Table 6: Decimalization, Shareholder base, and Payout 
We relate changes in the shareholder base to changes in total payout and cash holdings around the introduction of decimal trading quotes on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ in 2000/2001 (decimalization). Following Fang et al. (2009) changes in all variables are calculated as the difference between the value of the variable 
at the end of 2001 and at the end of 1999. Panel A reports the effect of changes in the shareholder base on changes in total payout. We consider both the full 
sample of companies as well as only the companies which had a positive total payout in 1999. Panel B investigates the impact of changes in the shareholder base 
around decimalization on changes in cash holdings. Relative effective spread is trade-weighted average of bid ask-spread adjusted by the midpoint of bid-ask 
range. Total assets is the book value of company total assets (Compustat item #6). Residual volatility is four factor adjusted volatility of company stock returns 
estimated over 1 year window from daily data and expressed in yearly terms. All other variables are described in Appendix. We utilize industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100. 
Panel A. Change in Shareholder Base and Change in Total Payout 
 full sample if positive payout in 1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
∆Log(#Shareholders) 0.26 (0.00)      0.37 (0.00)       
   × Price 5-10$   0.38 (0.00)      0.60 (0.06)      
   × Price >10$   0.21 (0.00)      0.36 (0.02)     
∆Excess shareholder base    0.54 (0.00)       0.66 (0.01)   
   × Price 5-10$       0.73 (0.00)       0.82 (0.01) 
   × Price >10$       0.48 (0.00)       0.62 (0.03) 
∆Institut. ownership 0.15 (0.90) 0.13 (0.91) 0.72 (0.64) 0.69 (0.66) -1.18 (0.50) -1.18 (0.50) -1.13 (0.53) -1.13 (0.52) 
∆Relative eff. spread -5.60 (0.29) -4.46 (0.29) -5.28 (0.58) -5.34 (0.58) -13.74 (0.17) -14.01 (0.16) -10.43 (0.26) -10.48 (0.25) 
∆Log(Total assets) -0.75 (0.01) -0.74 (0.01) -1.20 (0.00) -1.19 (0.00) -1.68 (0.00) -1.68 (0.00) -2.91 (0.00) -2.92 (0.00) 
∆Residual volatility -7.95 (0.10) -3.63 (0.11) -17.02 (0.38) -17.56 (0.38) -31.37 (0.00) -30.35 (0.00) -24.67 (0.32) -24.77 (0.31) 
∆Past year return -0.52 (0.00) -0.59 (0.00) -0.67 (0.00) -0.68 (0.00) -0.58 (0.01) -0.57 (0.01) -0.75 (0.00) -0.76 (0.00) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2 
N  2724  2724  1913  1913  1726  1726  1779  1396 
Adj R2  0.023  0.024  0.030  0.030  0.036  0.037  0.055  0.055 
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Panel B. Change in Shareholder Base and Change in Cash Holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
∆Log(#Shareholders) -0.89 (0.06)      
   × Price 5-10$   -1.11 (0.04)    
   × Price >10$   -0.54 (0.29)    
∆Excess shareholder base    -1.05 (0.03)  
   × Price 5-10$       -1.60 (0.05) 
   × Price >10$       -0.85 (0.04) 
∆Institut. ownership  10.98 (0.00) 10.88 (0.00) 13.08 (0.01) 13.18 (0.01) 
∆Relative eff. spread 22.00 (0.06) 22.49 (0.06) 27.47 (0.34) 27.48 (0.34) 
∆Log(Total assets) 10.77 (0.00) 10.80 (0.00) 11.12 (0.00) 11.10 (0.00) 
∆Residual volatility -49.06 (0.06) -49.63 (0.06) -74.45 (0.37) -72.88 (0.38) 
∆Past year return 1.64 (0.07) 1.64 (0.05) 1.00 (0.29) 1.01 (0.29) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2 
N  2724  2724  1913  1913 
Adj R2  0.1284  0.1281  0.1197  0.1194
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Table 7: The Effect of Share Repurchases and Special Dividends on Shareholder Base 
We present the results of the effect of share repurchases and special dividends on the shareholder base in the 
year when the special distribution is undertaken and in the subsequent year. The change in shareholder base in 
year t is calculated as the difference in the logarithm of the number of common shareholders of record at the end 
of year t and year t-1. The dependent variable is the change in shareholder base at year t (t+1), where year t is a 
year when a special distribution is made. All variables are described in Appendix. All estimates are multiplied 
by 100. 
 ∆Shareholder Baset ∆Shareholder Baset ∆Shareholder Baset+1 ∆Shareholder Baset+1
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Share repurchaset -1.26 (0.03) -2.40 (0.02) -2.44 (0.01) -2.51 (0.01) 
Special dividendt 4.45 (0.02) 14.01 (0.02) -0.19 (0.64) 2.62 (0.01) 
∆Shareholder baset     -7.74 (0.01) -3.97 (0.01) 
∆Shareholder baset-1 -14.52 (0.01) -11.27 (0.01) -3.25 (0.01) -5.07 (0.01) 
∆Shareholder baset-2 -4.27 (0.01) -5.41 (0.01)     
Log (Market cap) 0.17 (0.53) 1.20 (0.15) -0.83 (0.88) 1.15 (0.53) 
Log (B/M) -4.90 (0.01) -5.80 (0.01) -5.37 (0.01) -1.84 (0.01) 
D/E -0.89 (0.01) -1.29 (0.03) -2.36 (0.42) -1.36 (0.51) 
P/E 0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.19) -2.69 (0.99) 1.11 (0.99) 
Operating income 3.07 (0.24) 15.07 (0.16) 1.18 (0.01) 1.35 (0.01) 
R&D 3.64 (0.09) 8.50 (0.01) 1.52 (0.01) 2.04 (0.02) 
Total payout -33.57 (0.01) -52.95 (0.01) -1.37 (0.01) -1.15 (0.01) 
Past year return 1.76 (0.02) 1.60 (0.17) 7.87 (0.01) 3.82 (0.01) 
Volatility 44.54 (0.17) 446.65 (0.05) -0.95 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01) 
Capex 22.63 (0.02) 38.38 (0.03) 0.74 (0.01) 0.95 (0.01) 
Cash 2.95 (0.02) -2.05 (0.52) 1.10 (0.02) -0.30 (0.08) 
Institutional ownership -0.57 (0.61) 4.78 (0.61) 1.00 (0.09) 0.87 (0.01) 
Industry concentration 15.90 (0.03) 18.17 (0.02) 2.40 (0.09) -0.25 (0.03) 
Stock liquidity 1.63 (0.01) 0.75 (0.34) 3.31 (0.61) 0.41 (0.79) 
Misvaluation (RRV)   1.56 (0.48)   0.04 (0.88) 
Whited-Wu index   4.56 (0.67)   1.38 (0.01) 
Managerial ownership   0.88 (0.96)   0.67 (0.01) 
OBC   1.04 (0.52)   0.43 (0.22) 
Industry  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2  SIC2 
Adj. R2  0.029  0.037  0.026  0.024 
Nobs  34345  9077  33465  8100 
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Table 8: Shareholder Base and the Choice of Payout Method 
We relate the excess shareholder base to the likelihood of paying a special dividend and undertaking a 
repurchase. Panel A presents univariate results on the relation between the excess shareholder base and the 
decision to pay special dividend and repurchase stock (likelihood and size) in the subsequent year. Panel B 
presents results of a probit analysis of the relation between the excess shareholder base and the likelihood of 
undertaking a special distribution (share repurchase or special dividend). The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the company makes a special distribution (special dividend or repurchase) 
in the following year, 0 otherwise. Panel C presents the results of a probit analysis relating the excess 
shareholder base to the method of a special distribution. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the special distribution is a repurchase, 0 if it is a special dividend. We control for selectivity 
utilizing Heckman’s lambda from the selection regression reported in Panel B. All regressions control for time 
and industry fixed effects with standard errors clustered at industry level. Residuals from the regression reported 
in Table 2 are used as our measure of the shareholder base. All variables are described in Appendix. Marginal 
effects for all variables are multiplied by 100. 
Panel A. Univariate Analysis 
  
Likelihood of Special 
Dividend 
Likelihood of 
Repurchase Size of Repurchase 
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean t-Stat Prob Mean t-Stat Prob Mean t-Stat Prob 
High (Positive) 28065 1.40% 5.61 0.01 23.48% 4.63 0.01 1.41% 6.75 0.01 
Low (Negative) 27939 2.02%   21.84%   1.17%   
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Panel B. Shareholder Base and the Decision to Undertake a Special Distribution  
 Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME 
Excess shareholder base 0.03 (0.01) 0.84 0.03 (0.01) 0.76 
Log (Market cap) 0.09 (0.01) 2.70 0.07 (0.01) 2.02 
Log (B/M) 0.17 (0.01) 4.93 0.04 (0.04) 0.99 
D/E -0.02 (0.32) -0.51 -0.01 (0.40) -0.40 
P/E -0.00 (0.06) -0.01 -0.00 (0.11) -0.01 
Operating income 2.64 (0.01) 76.02 2.70 (0.01) 76.30 
R&D 0.13 (0.19) 3.82 0.17 (0.01) 4.76 
Dividend-to-earnings -0.16 (0.10) -4.62 -0.15 (0.01) -4.35 
Repurchase-to-earnings 0.15 (0.01) 4.36 0.15 (0.01) 4.22 
Past year return -0.13 (0.01) -3.61 -0.15 (0.01) -4.25 
Volatility -14.72 (0.01) -424.36 -21.28 (0.01) -601.71
Capex -1.83 (0.01) -52.86 -1.98 (0.01) -56.11 
Institutional ownership 0.29 (0.01) 8.26 0.24 (0.01) 6.68 
Industry concentration 0.13 (0.25) 3.80 0.17 (0.29) 4.77 
Stock liquidity -0.05 (0.01) -1.45 -0.04 (0.01) -1.26 
Misvaluation (RRV)    -0.39 (0.04) -10.99 
Whited-Wu index    -0.49 (0.01) -13.94 
Log(Firm age) 0.07 (0.01) 2.11 0.08 (0.01) 2.38 
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes  
Time dummies  Yes   Yes  
Clustering  SIC2   SIC2  
Adj R2  0.101   0.112  
N  52526   38450  
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Panel C. Shareholder Base and the Choice of Special Distribution (Share Repurchase vs Special 
Dividend) 
 Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME 
Excess shareholder base 0.12 (0.02) 0.59 0.09 (0.09) 0.39 0.13 (0.10) 0.07 
log (Market cap) 0.13 (0.10) 0.66 0.03 (0.82) 0.11 0.19 (0.06) 0.10 
log (B/M) 0.09 (0.55) 0.44 -0.14 (0.44) -0.56 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 
D/E 0.05 (0.31) 0.27 0.09 (0.24) 0.33 0.28 (0.18) 0.15 
P/E 0.00 (0.37) -0.01 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 
Operating income 0.66 (0.77) 3.26 -2.85 (0.16) -11.32 0.21 (0.91) 0.12 
R&D 5.68 (0.01) 28.17 7.43 (0.01) 29.75 2.38 (0.28) 1.33 
Dividend-to-earnings -0.43 (0.01) -2.12 -0.27 (0.03) -1.07 -0.22 (0.01) -0.93
Repurchase-to-earnings 0.32 (0.01) 1.59 0.20 (0.10) 0.79 0.12 (0.17) 0.47 
Past year return -0.53 (0.01) -2.61 -0.37 (0.01) -1.49 -0.31 (0.17) -0.17
Volatility 7.72 (0.39) 38.30 30.22 (0.06) 119.82 18.75 (0.75) 10.46
Capex -0.60 (0.75) -3.00 1.53 (0.34) 6.07 -0.20 (0.91) -0.11
Institutional ownership 0.95 (0.01) 4.72 0.55 (0.03) 2.17 1.11 (0.07) 0.62 
Industry concentration 0.50 (0.40) 2.48 0.62 (0.20) 2.46 3.06 (0.13) 1.71 
Stock liquidity 0.03 (0.49) 0.16 0.08 (0.16) 0.31 0.26 (0.27) 0.14 
Misvaluation (RRV)    0.02 (0.83) 0.09 -0.78 (0.13) -0.44
Whited-Wu index    0.02 (0.98) 0.06 0.67 (0.36) 0.37 
Managerial ownership       -0.38 (0.85) -0.21
OBC       1.29 (0.00) 0.72 
G-index       0.07 (0.01) 0.04 
Lambda 0.71 (0.70) 3.51 -0.90 (0.38) -3.55 -0.52 (0.48) -2.62
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Time dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Clustering  SIC2   SIC2   SIC2  
Adj R2  0.195   0.235   0.296  
N  12336   8947   3330  
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Table 9: VAR 
We report the results of panel vector-autoregressive regressions (with 1 lag). The dependent variables are measured at the end of next year. All other variables are 
measured at the end of current year. All variables are described in Appendix. All estimates are multiplied by 100. 
  Total payout Cash Excess Shareholder Base 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Total payout 69.70 (0.01) 57.19 (0.01)   1.31 (0.30) 2.67 (0.66) -1.46 (0.86) 
Cash   0.52 (0.01) 73.72 (0.01) 72.29 (0.01) 1.94 (0.13) 0.19 (0.88) 
Excess shareholder base 0.12 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) -0.08 (0.02) -0.08 (0.06) 90.97 (0.01) 91.10 (0.01) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
Adj R2 0.274 0.367 0.600 0.622 0.805 0.811 
N 61043 48202 61043 48202 61043 48202 
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Table 10: The Relation between Shareholder Base and Total Payout and Cash Holding: Sorting Evidence 
We examine the relation between excess shareholder base and total payout and cash holdings for different size, value, institutional ownership, financial 
constraints (Whited-Wu), and misvaluation groups. At the end of previous year companies are sorted in 20 (5 X 2 X 2) groups based on size, book-to-market/ 
instutional ownership/Whited-Wu index/misvaluation and excess shareholder base. In Panel A(B) we report the difference in average and median total payout 
(cash holdings) between high and low excess shareholder base groups. Differences in total payout and cash holdings are multiplied by 100. p-Values for 1-sided 
t-test and Wilcoxon test are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A. Total Payout 
 B/M IO WW Misvaluation 
Size Low High Low High Low High Low High
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Small 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15) 
2 0.56 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.84 0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.23 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.02 0.58 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.55) (0.49) (0.64) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) 
3 0.70 0.42 0.34 0.26 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.20 0.32 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.41 0.28 0.50 0.34 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
4 0.91 0.85 0.47 0.56 0.79 0.82 0.34 0.32 0.70 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.48 0.67 0.63 0.68 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large 0.79 0.80 0.43 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.67 0.63 0.26 0.39 0.28 0.36 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.64) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) 
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Panel B. Cash Holdings 
 
 
 
 B/M IO WW Misvaluation 
Size Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Small 0.02 -0.07 -0.58 -0.19 -0.10 0.44 -0.37 -0.291 -0.19 -0.17 -1.22 -1.571 -0.34 -0.47 0.62 0.64 
 (0.95) (0.30) (0.11) (0.26) (0.83) (0.11) (0.41) (0.19) (0.64) (0.47) (0.03) (0.02) (0.62) (0.23) (0.18) (0.01) 
2 -0.56 -0.56 -1.55 -1.06 -0.15 -1.04 -1.37 -1.396 -1.00 -1.15 -0.43 -0.16 -0.55 -1.95 -0.72 -0.22 
 (0.23) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.44) (0.24) (0.33) (0.01) (0.16) (0.41) 
3 -2.10 -2.43 -2.96 -1.57 -2.83 -2.36 -2.48 -2.27 -1.94 -1.30 -1.68 -2.77 -3.85 -4.62 -1.42 -0.96 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
4 -3.29 -2.86 -2.61 -1.51 -4.25 -3.13 -2.28 -1.11 -1.13 -0.11 -2.53 -2.79 -3.63 -3.12 -3.78 -2.34 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large -3.21 -2.14 -1.09 -0.88 -3.10 -1.48 -2.50 -1.76 -0.17 0.10 -2.54 -2.07 -2.08 -0.93 -4.43 -2.75 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
